
The Indian Patent Office (IPO) delivered a landmark decision on 15 April 2026 in relation to Indian Patent Application No. 202017019068, filed by Dr. Stephen L. Thaler, which named an artificial intelligence system,
DABUS (Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience), as the sole inventor. The decision represents India’s first substantive determination on whether an AI system can be recognised as an inventor under the Patents Act, 1970, and aligns India with the prevailing global position that inventorship under current patent law remains human-centric.
Background of the Application
The application related to a food container with a fractal wall profile, asserted to have been autonomously generated by DABUS without human intervention. Dr. Thaler claimed entitlement to the invention as the owner of the AI system and filed international applications across the world, including India. He argued that he, as the owner of the DABUS source code and the hardware on which it operated, was entitled to the benefit of inventions autonomously generated by the system, and that the Patents Act, 1970 does not expressly prohibit non-human inventors.
During prosecution of Indian Patent application, objections were raised on two principal grounds:
- Non-compliance with statutory requirements relating to inventorship, and
- Lack of inventive step.
Parallelly, a pre-grant opposition was also filed, leading the Patent Office to issue two separate orders—one under Section 15 (refusal after examination) and another disposing of the pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1).
Key Findings on Inventorship
In the Section 15 refusal order, the Controller held that an AI system cannot be recognised as the “true and first inventor” under Indian law. The reasoning was grounded in a combined reading of Sections 2(1)(y), 6, 7, and 10 of the Patents Act, which collectively presuppose an inventor capable of legal personality, executing declarations, holding rights, and assigning those rights to an Applicant. The Controller further noted that Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, while extending the term “person” to companies and associations, operates only in respect of entities capable of legal recognition, which AI systems are not.
The Controller rejected the argument that the Patents Act does not expressly prohibit non-human inventors, holding that the statutory framework implicitly requires an inventor to be a natural or juristic person. Ownership of DABUS, its source code, or the hardware on which it operated was found insufficient to establish “proof of right” under Section 7(2), as such rights must flow from a legally recognised inventor. Reliance on PCT declarations was also dismissed, with the Controller clarifying that international procedural mechanisms cannot override mandatory requirements under Indian law.
Inventive Step and Pre‑Grant Opposition
Independently of the inventorship issue, the Controller held that the claimed invention lacked an inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), as it was found to be obvious in light of prior art and common general knowledge, with no demonstrated technical advancement or unexpected effect. The Controller held that the mere adoption of a “fractal” geometric descriptor does not establish inventiveness in the absence of comparative experimental data or evidence of an unexpected technical advantage.
In the separate pre‑grant opposition order, the Patent Office clarified that inventorship-related objections are procedural in nature and cannot be sustained under Section 25(1)(f), which is confined to challenges concerning patentability of the invention rather than entitlement or compliance issues.
Significance of the Decision
The DABUS decision firmly establishes that, under the current Indian legal framework, AI-assisted inventions remain patentable only where a human inventor is identified. While the ruling leaves open broader policy debates on AI and innovation, it underscores that any shift toward recognising AI as an inventor would require legislative intervention, not judicial or administrative interpretation. The decision is consistent with outcomes in jurisdictions such as the UK, US, and EPO, reinforcing a global consensus on human inventorship under existing patent laws.
- whether the work in question is purely an ‘artistic work’ entitled to protection under the Copyright Act or whether it is a ‘design’ derived from such original artistic work and subjected to an industrial process based upon the language in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act;
- if such a work does not qualify for copyright protection, then the test of ‘functional utility’ will have to be applied so as to determine its dominant purpose, and then ascertain whether it would qualify for design protection under the Design Act.
The expression “artistic work” has a broad spectrum, while the expression “design” is restricted to specific features such as shape, configuration, pattern, and ornamentation applied to an article through an industrial process, resulting in a finished product that appeals to the eye.
The findings by the Supreme Court address overlaps or intersections between the two Statutes and ascertaining whether a work would qualify protection under the Copyright Act for being an ‘original artistic work’ or whether it would earn protection under the Designs Act.
This finding helps minimise overlap between two distinct protections in the Intellectual Property Rights by establishing clear parameters to distinguish works eligible for protection under the Designs Act versus the Copyright Act.
The Commercial Court adopted the two-pronged approach and passed an order dated 11th June 2025 in favour of Inox. The Commercial Court allowed ad-interim injunction against Cryogas Equipment Private Limited (Cryogas) and LNG Express India Private Limited (LNG Express) and restrained Cryogas and LNG from infringing Inox’s IP rights and confidential information till the final disposal of the suit.
The order clearly highlights that Proprietary Engineering Drawings can be considered both artistic and literary work, and gives clarity to apply the functionality test for distinguishing copyright protections from design registrations.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ramya Rao
Ramya is a Partner with K&S Partners and has over 14 years of experience in the domains of computer sciences, electronics and design.
- ramya.rao@knspartners.com

